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Abstract: Hitherto, it is not known if the integration of relationship concepts into traditional public-
sector construction contracts would improve project performance. This study hence examines the 
effects of contract strategies on project outcomes and relationship quality in the context of public-
sector construction projects in Sydney, Australia. It also identifies the relational contracting (RC) 
practices that are in place when certain contract strategies are adopted. Using a two-pronged research 
design, data were first collected from public owners and private contractors and consultants through 
a questionnaire survey. The data were analysed and the results were then validated by interviews. 
Correlation analysis shows that cost performance, client satisfaction, and relationship quality among 
contracting parties are significantly correlated with contract strategies. The findings indicate the 
important role that contract strategies play in project outcomes and interpersonal relationship. 
Among the 20 RC practices that are significantly correlated with contract strategies, 16 of them are 
related to clients and consultants, suggesting their important role in setting the tone of the 
relationship in a project. 
 





An appropriate contracting method coupled with clear and equitable contract documents do not 
ensure project success because the attitudes of the contracting parties and the relationships among the 
project participants are also equally important (Rahman and Kumaraswamy 2002a). The use of 
collaborative transactions may reduce disputes and increase team harmony, leading to better project 
performance (Walker 1998; Schwenk and Cosier 1993). On the other hand, relationship conflicts 
arising from interpersonal problems, friction, and personality clashes cause group members to work 
less effectively and produce suboptimal products (Argyris 1962). Rahman and Kumaraswamy 
(2002a) found that collaborative transaction through the adoption of relational contracting (RC) 
practices may be useful in reducing transaction costs as well as fostering cooperative relationships 
and better teamwork. 
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In Australia, alliance contracting as a relationship-based contractual arrangement is being used by 
public-sector clients to obtain value for money (Davis et al. 2009). This is a new alternative to 
traditional project-delivery systems to reduce the adversarial nature of most construction projects. In 
July 2011, the Infrastructure Working Group of the Council of Australian Governments issued the 
National Alliance Contracting Policy and Guidelines to provide a consistent national standard and 
promote practices for relational delivery (Dept. of Infrastructure and Transport 2013). However, 
there are many disputes on whether alliances have delivered value for money in past projects (Dept. 
of Treasury and Finance 2009). Hitherto, it is not known if the integration of relationship concepts 
into traditional public-sector construction contracts would improve project performance. 
 
The aim of this study is hence to investigate whether contract strategies affect project outcomes and 
interpersonal relations among contracting parties in public construction projects in Sydney, 
Australia. The specific objectives are to (1) investigate the contract strategies adopted in public 
projects, (2) find out if the type of contract strategies that are significantly correlated with project 
outcomes and interpersonal relations among contracting parties, and (3) discover the types of RC 
practices that must be in place when certain contract strategies are adopted. Because Australia covers 
a large area, the scope of this study is confined to public construction projects in Sydney. The 
contract strategies are confined to those affecting relationships, as defined in the next section. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Project Outcomes 
 
Project outcomes include the traditional triple project outcomes (completion within budget, on time, 
and to an acceptable level of quality), safety performance, environmental performance, stakeholder 
satisfaction, and profitability. This study considered project performance from the view of project 
delivery and organizational level competency. Under project delivery, the three main triple project 
outcomes, cost (Y1), time (Y2), and quality (Y3), were adopted as the performance metrics 
following Konchar and Sanvido (1998). For organizational-level competency, service quality was 
operationalized as client satisfaction with the project (Y4) following Ling et al. (2004). 
 
However, the previously mentioned performance metrics tell the contracting parties little or nothing 
about the condition of the environment in which the performance is attained (Crane et al. 1999). 
Crane et al. (1999) adopted relationship measures to track the activities and effectiveness of the 
working team. Cheung et al. (2003) also argued that it is necessary to use relationship measures to 
assess the behavioural aspects. The strength of relationships, including harmony during project 
implementation (Z1) and relationships between client and contractor (Z2), between contractor and 
consultant (Z3), and between client and consultant (Z4) at the end of project were used in this study. 
 
2.2 Contract Strategies Affecting Relationships 
 
Based on the theory of the firm (Coase 1937), companies in the construction industry would attempt 
to maximize their economic profit. They participate in public construction projects with the intention 
of increasing their revenue. They usually prefer to adopt formal contracts, which contain fairly 
explicit stipulations of proscribed and prescribed behaviours and risk allocation. This choice of 
organizational strategy is governed by the rational choice theory (Becker 1976). According to this 
theory, companies pursue their interests rationally, try to maximize utility, and would resort to 
institutional arrangements and formal contracts to guard against troubles, ignoring the identity of and 
past relationships with individual actors (Becker 1976). 
 
 
The basic idea behind the rational choice theory is that individuals make choices that can best help 
them achieve their objectives (Green and Shapiro 1996). Once the behaviour of one individual is 
established, this is assumed to be typical or representative of some larger group of actors in a 
particular market (Becker 1976). When decisions are made using the rational-choice approach, these 
decision makers are termed as economic men who exhibit self-interested behaviour (Williamson 
1975). These economic men rely on institutional arrangements to guard against trouble, transact with 
others based on pure economic motives, ignoring the identity of and any past relationships with the 
individual actor. 
 
However, risk is inherent and difficult to deal with in a construction project. It is difficult for the 
partners to completely predict potential problems and outcomes and have all essential information. 
The basic assumptions of expected utility maximization under conditions of uncertainty are 
especially problematic (Machina 1987). 
 
The converse of rational choice is not irrational choice, but relational choice. Decision makers 
rationally and deliberately make relational choices if these lead to profit in the long run, when long-
term and future relationships are involved (Eccles 1981). Relational choices exist because most 
behaviours are closely embedded in networks of social relations (Granovetter 1985). The decision 
maker may look beyond rational choice to consider not only economic goals but also sociability, 
approval, status, and power (Hirschman 1977). In other words, the objective of behaviours is 
therefore not only to maximize utility but also to take into account other social goals (Granovetter 
1985). 
 
Jones et al. (1997) proposed that four conditions promote embeddedness among parties: demand 
uncertainty with stable supply, complex tasks under time pressure, customized exchanges high in 
human asset specificity, and frequent exchanges among parties embedded in the network. These 
conditions exist in construction projects, which are generally characterized by high risks, complex 
tasks, tight schedules, and long project durations. It is understandable that participants in a 
construction project are usually closely embedded in a social network of relations. Pryke (2004) had 
conceptualized the construction project coalition as a network of relationships. Ling and Li (2012) 
found that network strategies are relevant to manage construction projects effectively. 
 
The previous literature review suggests that the contract strategies that firms pursue may be solely 
economic profit (rational choice) or a balance of economic and social goals (relational contracting). 
This would determine the following: basis upon which choices and decisions are made, ranging from 
rational choice to relational choice (X1); focus of the firm, ranging from mostly profit to mostly 
relationship (X2); and way of guarding against trouble, ranging from relying on formal contractual 
controls to trust (X3). 
 
2.3 Relational Contracting 
 
RC is based on the recognition of mutual benefits and win-win scenarios through more cooperative 
relationships among contracting parties (Rahman and Kumaraswamy 2004a). It underpins various 
approaches, such as partnering, alliancing, joint venturing, long term contracting, joint risk-sharing 
mechanisms, integrated project delivery, and other collaborative working arrangements (Rahman and 
Kumaraswamy 2004a; American Institute of Architects 2007). 
 
The literature on RC practices were reviewed and summarized in Table 1. In this paper, the term RC 
practices is taken to mean relational practices, or practices based on good relationship management, 
which are RC type or RC based, even though the actual contracts may not have formal RC 




RC practices are divided into three categories: individual organizational features and practices 
adopted by each contracting party, practices adopted in tandem by two of the contracting parties, and 
practices adopted by all the major contracting parties in unison (Table 1). For brevity, these practices 
are coded as a, b, and c for client, contractor, and consultant, respectively, followed by a reference 
number. Individual organizational features and practices adopted by each contracting party are coded 
as a-#, b-#, and c-#; practices adopted in tandem by two of the contracting parties are coded as ab-#, 
ac-#, and bc-#; and practices adopted by all the major contracting parties in unison are coded as abc-
#. The number symbol represents the reference number of the RC practice. 
 
 
2.4 Knowledge Gap 
 
The brief literature review suggests that there are different contract strategies affecting relationships 
(X1, X2, and X3). The gap in knowledge is that it is not known if the adoption of a certain contract 
strategy could lead to good outcomes in public construction projects. Another gap in knowledge is 
that it is not known what RC practices are associated with a contract strategy. The fieldwork was 
thus undertaken to uncover the association between contract strategies and project outcomes, and 
between RC practices and contract strategies. 
 
3. Research Methodology 
 
3.1 Research Design and Data Collection 
 
A two-pronged research design was adopted for this study, the first being a structured questionnaire 
survey conducted between June and November 2011 in Sydney, Australia. Respondents were 
requested to provide the data of a completed public-sector project in which they had been involved. 
The objectives of the survey were to evaluate the strength of relationships among contracting parties, 
the performance outcomes of completed public construction projects, the contract strategies adopted, 
and the extent to which the RC practices were present, observed, practiced, or emphasized in the 
project. 
 
The questionnaire comprised several sections. Section A requested information on the completed 
public-sector project, the strength of the relationships among contracting parties, the contract 
strategies adopted, and the project’s performance outcomes. The strength of relationships, including 
harmony during project implementation (Z1) and relationships between client and contractor (Z2), 
between contractor and consultant (Z3), and between client and consultant (Z4) at the end of project 
were rated by a five-point Likert scale (1 = very low, 3 = neutral, 5 = very high). Respondents were 
requested to provide the cost (Y1) and time (Y2) performance based on planned and actual numbers. 
Quality performance (Y3) and client satisfaction (Y4) were rated on a five-point Likert scale (1 = 
very dissatisfied, 3 = neutral, 5 = very satisfied). 
 
The contract strategies adopted were measured using three dimensions: X1 = basis for decision 
making; X2 = organizational focus in the project; and X3 = method to guard against trouble. These 
were measured on a five-point Likert scale. For X1, the anchors were 1 = rational choices mostly, 3 
= both rational and relational choices equally, and 5 = relational choices mostly. For X2, the anchors 
were 1 = profit and cost mostly, 3 = both profit and cost and relationship equally, and 5 = 
relationship mostly. For X3, the anchors were 1 = contract mostly, 3 = both contract and network 
equally, and 5 = network mostly. In Section B, respondents were asked to indicate the extent to 
which RC practices were adopted on a five-point Likert scale (1 = very low, 3 = neutral, 5 = very 
high). Respondents were also given the opportunity to provide other suggestions and comments as 
well as demographic characteristics of themselves and their companies. 
 
The unit of analysis is a completed public-sector project, regardless of the extent to which RC 
approaches were adopted. The population is thus completed public projects in Australia and the 
sampling frame is completed public projects in Sydney, Australia. To collect the data, multiple 
stakeholders comprising public-sector clients and consultants, private-sector consultants (e.g., 
architects, engineers, quantity surveyors, and project managers), and contractors who had been 
involved in public construction projects in Sydney were approached. The sampling frame for public 
officials was obtained from government directories, and questionnaires were sent to all of them 
because the sample size is not large. The sampling frames for private consultants and contractors 
were derived from the respective professional and trade institutions; samples were selected 
randomly. Because this group may contain those who have not handled public projects before, the 
questionnaire clearly stated that only those who had completed public projects should fill out the 
questionnaire. 
 
The next step to validate the statistical results and elaborate on the findings of the questionnaire 
survey was done by conducting in-depth interviews with practitioners and academics in Australia. 
They were identified through convenience sampling. A content analysis of the interview transcripts 
was conducted to distil the findings. 
 
3.2 Data Analysis Method 
 
The data were analysed using SPSS software. The main statistical methods used were descriptive 
statistics, one-sample t-test, and Pearson’s correlation analysis. The confidence interval (CI) was set 
at 0.95. The one-sample t-test procedure was performed on the contract strategies (X1 to X3), the 
performance metrics (Y1 to Y4), and the relationship metrics (Z1 to Z4) to determine if the RC 
strategy was adopted to a significant extent and if the projects had significantly good performance 
and relationships. The test value to be compared for X1 to X3, Y1 to Y4, Z3, and Z4 was 3 (neutral), 
while the test value for Z1 and Z2 was 0 (actual cost and time equal to planned cost and time). To 
determine whether a greater adoption of the RC strategy led to better project outcomes, Pearson’s 
correlation analysis was conducted. Each pair of variables in the Pearson’s correlation analysis 
comprised one of the three dimensions of contract strategies (X1 to X3) and one of the four 
performance metrics (Y1 to Y4) or one of the four relationship metrics (Z1 to Z4). Another round of 
Pearson’s correlation analysis was conducted to discover the types of RC practices (Table 1) that 
were in place when certain contract strategies (X1 to X3) are adopted. Each pair of variables in this 
round of Pearson’s correlation analysis comprised one of the three dimensions of contract strategies 
(X1 to X3) and one of the RC practices (Table 1). 
 
4. Characteristics of the Sample 
 
Survey questionnaires were sent to 322 target respondents in Sydney, Australia. A total of 30 valid 
completed questionnaires were returned, with one respondent who did not provide personal data. The 
response rate of 9.3% is relatively low and the sample size of 30 is small. However, statistical 
analysis could still be performed because in accordance with the generally accepted rule, the central 
limit theorem holds true when the sample size is no less than 30 (Ott and Longnecker 2001). 
 
To ensure the same project is not captured more than once, when the data were received the project 
information including planned and actual numbers of cost and time performance, type of client, 
contractual arrangement, bidding method for contractors, and consultants were checked. No 
responses from the same project were received. The characteristics of the respondents are given in 
Table 2. 
 
The respondents’ experience in various types of public construction projects, which covered 
predominantly public housing, infrastructure (transportation, water plant, and power plant), and other 
buildings (offices, hospitals, and schools). The number of years of respondents’ experience ranged 
from 2 to 45 years, with an average of 24 years. Seventy-two percent of the respondents had no less 
than 15 years of experience. The respondents’ firms engaged between 3 and 100,000 employees, 
with an average of 7,037 employees. The results showed that 67.9% of the respondents’ firms had 




According to Table 2, the majority (70%) of the clients are on-going clients. This indicates that the 
findings would be more applicable to clients with the knowledge and experience in project 
management who would be able to add value to construction projects. Table 2 also reinforces the 
notion that government procurement for construction and engineering services are generally 
transparent. Selective bidding, in which an invitation to tender is made to a limited number of 
tenderers, is the most frequently used method in selecting contractors and consultants. The results 
also show that government in-house consultants (10%) play some part in providing architectural and 
engineering professional services. 
Table 3 shows that projects had significantly harmonious relationships during project 
implementation (Z1: mean = 3.50, p = 0.045), pointing to good ongoing relationships. At the end of 
the project, there were also significantly good relationships between clients and contractors (Z2: 
mean = 3.93, p = 0.000), between contractors and consultants (Z3: mean = 3.76, p = 0.002), and 
between clients and consultants (Z4: mean = 3.70, p = 0.002). 
 
The t-test results in Table 3 also show that public construction projects in Australia achieved 
significantly good quality performance (Y3: mean = 4.27, p = 0.000) and client satisfaction (Y4: 
mean = 3.97, p = 0.000), but had significantly poor cost performance (Y1: 11.73% cost overrun, p = 
0.005) and time performance (Y2: 13.60% schedule overrun, p = 0.007). 
 
In the second stage, eight subject matter experts in Australia were interviewed after much persuasion 
and many follow-up telephone calls. Their experience in the construction industry ranged from 4 to 
25 years, with an average of 15.3 years. They work for the public client, contractors, and research 
institutes. 
 
5. Result 1: Contract Strategies and Their Effects 
 
5.1 Contract Strategies 
 
The first objective of this study is to investigate the contract strategies that are adopted in public 
projects in Australia. The one sample t-test results in Table 3 show that contracting parties in public 
projects in Australia adopt balanced contract strategies that neither lean significantly towards rational 
choice nor significantly towards relational choice. The results indicate that they consider both 
rational and relational choices equally when making decisions (X1), focus on both profit and 
relationship (X2), and rely on both formal contract and trust to guard against troubles (X3). The 
findings agree with Cheung et al. (2006) that a contractual relationship is not absolutely relational or 
completely discrete, but exists on a spectrum, which ranges from relational to discrete. 
 
A closer look at the contract strategies on relationships was taken in Fig. 1. The majority of the 
contracting parties considered both profit and cost and relationship as their focus in the public 
projects because the median, upper, and lower quartiles all fell in the 3—both profit and cost and 
relationship equally category. A slightly higher agreement was seen in making decisions based on 
rational choices than relational choices, as well as in guarding against trouble based on contractual 
arrangements than network and relationships because the lower quartiles were in the 2 category for 
basis for decision making and method to guard against trouble. 
 
 
5.2 Effects of Contract Strategies 
 
The second objective of this study is to find out if contract strategies affect project outcomes and 
interpersonal relations among contracting parties. Correlation analysis was conducted to identify 
associations among contract strategies (X1 to X3), project outcomes (Y1 to Y4), and quality of 
relationships (Z1 to Z4). The results are shown in Tables 4 and 5, and the significant correlations are 








There is significant correlation between the basis for decision making (X1) and the quality of 
relationships including harmony during project implementation (Z1) and relationships between client 
and contractor (Z2), between contractor and consultant (Z3), and between client and consultant (Z4) 
at the end of project (Table 4). Table 5 shows that X1 may be used to explain 16 and 19% of the 
variability in Z2 and Z3, respectively. When parties make decisions or choices based on a relational 
contract as opposed to rational choices, relationships among them improve. This may be because 
relational approaches decrease the occurrence of conflicts, leading to improved task performance 
(Guzzo and Shea 1992). Relational approaches also allow members to collaborate to develop good 
designs (Kluenker 1996). These good outputs pull parties together to produce deep relationships. 
 
Table 4 shows significant correlation between the basis for decision making (X1) and cost 
performance (Y1), and it accounts for 19% variability in Y1 (Table 5). The result suggests that if 
choices or decisions are mostly relational, cost overrun will worsen. The expense of conducting RC 
practices has often been cited as a reason to avoid the process (Glagola and Sheedy 2002; Chan et al. 
2003). It is because the formation of a relationship arrangement requires extra staff, time, and 
resources, which makes it possibly costly to align all parties (Larson and Drexler 1997). 
 
Table 4 also shows a significant correlation between the focus of an organization (X2) and the level 
of harmony during project implementation (Z1). This finding suggests that when contracting parties 
focus more on relationships rather than profit and cost only, they have a higher level of harmony. 
The finding agrees with Rahman and Kumaraswamy (2008), who found that integrated objectives 
among contracting parties is a significant critical factor for facilitating RC. Contracting parties are 
generally adversaries who need to protect and enforce their individual rights, minimize their 
liabilities, and maximize their profits. Less emphasis on their own profit and cost would possibly 
change their adversarial positions and this leads to a higher level of harmony. 
 
Table 4 shows a significant correlation between the method used to guard against trouble (X3) and 
the quality of relationships including harmony during project implementation (Z1), between 
contractor and consultant (Z3), and between client and consultant (Z4) at the end of project. Table 5 
shows that X3 accounts for 35 and 29% of variability in Z1 and Z4, respectively. There is also a 
significant correlation between the method used to guard against trouble (X3) and client satisfaction 
(Y4), accounting for 12% of variability in Y4. Parties may guard against trouble by agreeing on a 
common dispute-resolution mechanism. This helps to improve relationships (Rahman and 
Kumaraswamy 2004a, b). When network and relationships are much relied on to handle trouble, 
contracting parties may be less adversarial and hence have better ongoing and end relationships. 
Clients are likely to be more satisfied as the level of client satisfaction could be determined by the 
transformation process (Yasamis et al. 2002). One of the interviewees explained that when disputes 
arose, sometimes renegotiation among partners, especially with the government, is more efficient 
and effective than institutional arrangement such as arbitration or a lawsuit because these cause 
significant delay and create bad relationships in the project. 
 
6. Result 2: Contract Strategies and Their Corresponding Practices 
 
The third objective of this study is to discover the types of practices that are in place when certain 
contract strategies are adopted. Correlation analysis was conducted between the RC practices 
adopted in Table 1 and the contract strategies implemented (X1 to X3). The results are shown in 
Table 6. There are 20 RC practices that are significantly correlated with the contract strategies, 
including four individual practices of clients, six individual practices of consultants, and six practices 
adopted in tandem by clients and consultants, suggesting that clients and consultants play an 




6.1 Basis for Decision Making (X1) 
 
Table 6 shows that clients’ acceptance of RC practices (a-4) and organizational culture fit to RC 
practices (a-5) are significantly correlated with the basis for decision making (X1). Ng et al. (2002) 
found that when owners’ organizational culture does not fit a RC approach, project partnering would 
be ineffective. When clients accept the concept of RC and have the ability to implement RC 
practices, contracting parties can do away with detailed and formal contracts (Palay 1985), and 
thereafter make decisions that are based more on relational choices. 
 
When consultants make decisions based more on relational mindset (X1), they are likely to commit 
long term to other contracting parties (c-9). This echoes the finding mentioned previously that 
consultants play an important role in setting the tone of the relationship in a project. According to the 
public-client interviewee: “Because of the long-term involvement of consultants in a construction 
project from inception to project completion, contractors would be more willing to adopt relational 
transaction if consultants are committed long term to the contractors.” 
 
There is also significant correlation between the basis for decision making (X1) and the ongoing 
social relationships between clients and consultants (ac-7). This finding suggests that contracting 
parties are likely to make decisions based on relational transaction when there is a good ongoing 
social relationship between clients and consultants. The reason may be attributed to the trust and 
friendship that are present in ongoing relationships, causing contracting parties to be more willing to 
compromise when problems arise and thus adopting relational transactions (Castro et al. 2009). The 
implication is that past and current relationships may be taken into account in the selection of 
consultants. 
 
Table 6 shows that the level of reciprocation and face-saving gestures between clients and 
consultants (ac-8) and between contractors and consultants (bc-8) is significantly correlated with the 
basis for decision making (X1) and the focus of organization (X2). According to the interviewees, 
these factors are cross correlated. When there is a high level of reciprocation or face-saving gesture 
in place, contracting parties are willing to make relational choices and emphasize the importance of 
relationships. However, the imposition of reciprocity may deprive other participants of choice 
because they may choose not to have the reciprocity adjusted in their favour because of the various 
costs to them in doing so (Macneil 1983). 
 
6.2 Focus of Organization (X2) 
 
Table 6 shows the three RC practices that are significantly correlated with the focus of an 
organization (X2) when they are adopted by clients to a large extent. These are clients’ acceptance of 
RC practices (a-4), clients’ flexibility when situations change (a-7), and clients’ previous experience 
in RC approaches (a-10). These findings again reinforce the important role played by public owners 
in promoting RC practices in the project. Moreover, a construction project is usually characterized by 
multiple uncertainties, which calls for the flexibility and adaptability of contracting parties in 
responding to change. Therefore, a-4, a-7, and a-10 are required to persuade other parties to focus 
more on relationships. 
 
There is significant correlation between the focus of an organization (X2) and the consultants’ level 
of innovation and creativity (c-1) and financial capacity (c-6). This finding suggests that when 
consultants are innovative and have strong financial capacity, they are likely to focus more on 
relationships. The contractor interviewee explained that consultants’ organizational characteristics 
such as innovation and financial capacity are related to the consultants’ performance. Consultants 
who perform well are able to differentiate themselves and need not focus on cost minimization or 
profit maximization. 
 
There is also a significant correlation between the focus of an organization (X2) and the level of 
reciprocation and face-saving gestures between clients and consultants (ac-8) and between 
contractors and consultants (bc-8). This has been discussed in the previous section. 
 
Table 6 shows that the joint coordination and monitoring plans among contracting parties (abc-5) and 
the clearly defined equitable risk-sharing arrangement among contracting parties (abc-6) are 
significantly correlated with the focus of an organization (X2). Mohr and Spekman (1994) argued 
that coordination helps to reflect what each party expects of the other parties in fulfilling a set of 
tasks. When contracting parties share a strong emphasis on the importance of relationships, they are 
likely to set up effective joint coordination and monitoring plans. The resultant increase in contact 
points among the contracting parties will lead to stability in an uncertain environment (Bayramoglu 
2001). In addition, when contracting parties focus more on relationships, they are aware of the 
consequences of the excessive use of exculpatory clauses and ambiguous terms in allocating risks 
that can lead to a higher possibility of dispute occurrence (Zaghloul and Hartman 2003). 
 
6.3 Method to Guard against Trouble (X3) 
 
Table 6 shows that contracting parties are likely to use network and relationships to guard against 
trouble (X3) when consultants accept and support RC practices (c-4, c-5, and c-15). Because 
consultants play multifaceted roles in construction projects and are usually involved in the project 
from inception to project completion, especially in dispute resolution (Ip 2012), their experience in 
RC approaches is expected to affect the other parties’ choice of resolution should any problem arise. 
 
There is a significant correlation between the method to guard against trouble (X3) and four practices 
that are adopted in tandem by clients and consultants. These are mutual understanding (ac-3), open 
and effective communication (ac-4), level of interpersonal relations and cultural harmony at 
individual level (ac-5), and sharing of project information (ac-6). This finding suggests that 
contracting parties that rely on trust when handling any challenges are more likely to have mutual 
understanding, open and effective communication, strong interpersonal relations, and sharing of 
project information. It is not advisable to rely on formal controls to manage conflicts. Instead, parties 
should exercise ethics, neutrality, and independence (Van Gramberg 2006). The contractor 
interviewee shared that this is more so when relationships are much relied on to handle problems 
because it is considered more flexible. 
 
Two interviewees said that soft methods like renegotiation and mediation instead of hard methods 
like litigation are increasingly being used to resolve disputes in Australia’s construction industry 
because litigation is costly, time consuming, stressful, and subject to the risk of destroying an 
organization’s reputation in the industry. However, the growing importance of relationships in 
handling problems does not mean that the clarity of contract conditions such as scope of contract, 
duties, and responsibilities is any less important. In fact, the higher the level of pre-contract 
negotiation to clarify contract conditions, the higher the quality of the decision-making process for 
dispute resolution during the construction phase, and thereafter the lower the intensity of conflict 
(Aibinu 2009). This is echoed by the significant correlation between the method to guard against 




Using a two-pronged research design, i.e., a questionnaire survey and in-depth interviews, this study 
investigated whether contract strategies affect project outcomes and interpersonal relations among 
contracting parties in public construction projects in Australia. The results show that contracting 
parties in public projects adopt a balanced approach that does not lean towards formal controls and 
rational choice or towards relational contracting. It was also found that cost performance (Y1), client 
satisfaction (Y4), and relationships among contracting parties (Z1 to Z4) are significantly correlated 
with contract strategies (X1 to X3). The findings add to the current knowledge base by showing that 
contract strategies are important and may have an effect on the project performance outcome and 
relationship quality among contracting parties of public projects. It is therefore important for 
contracting parties to pay attention to relational contracting when managing public construction 
projects. 
 
The study also identified RC practices that are significantly correlated with contract strategies (X1 to 
X3). Among the 20 practices that are found to be significantly correlated with contract strategies, 16 
are related to clients and consultants, suggesting that clients and consultants play an important role in 
setting the tone of the relationship in a project. It is recommended that owners and consultants adopt 
the practices identified in Table 6 because these are the types of practices that are in place when 
relational contract strategies on relationships are adopted and these lead to better relationships, better 
cost performance, and better client satisfaction. 
 
The scope of this study is limited to investigating the associations among RC practices, contract 
strategies, and outcomes in Sydney, Australia. The interrelation between project outcome variables 
(Y1–Y4) and relationship variables (Z1–Z4) is outside the scope of this paper but could be a subject 
of a future research. One limitation faced in this study is the small number of valid responses due to 
the difficulty in collecting data in Sydney, Australia, by a team based in Singapore. Consequently, 
advanced analysis techniques like structural equation modelling could not be adopted in this study to 
explain the complex interrelationship among set of constructs and variables. The next limitation is 
that contracting parties, especially contractors, may not have complete information of cost and time 
performance to inform this research. To control the number of outcome variables to reduce 
complexity in data collection, this study chose client satisfaction instead of stakeholder satisfaction, 
such as satisfaction experienced by contractors and consultants. In future studies, more sets of data 
could be collected in order to compare RC practices and contract strategies of the various contracting 
parties, the satisfaction of different stakeholders, and in different parts of Australia. A case study 
approach could also be considered, whereby for the same project, data could be collected from 
different team members so that complete information could be gathered. Relational transaction may 
be dependent on the capabilities and skills of the individuals. A future study could be conducted to 
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